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Abstract 
What kind of professional experts dominate within the European Commission—lawyers, economists or others? Driven 
by the notion that the role of professional experts is shaped by organizational features, the article examines how differ-
ent kinds of expertise are inscribed in the Commission’s recruitment system and organizational structure. The analysis 
shows that while economics may have overtaken law as the most common educational background in the Commission, 
neither the recruitment system nor the departmental structure appears to encourage the development of economic 
expertise. The proportion of staff hired through economics competitions has dropped markedly, and there are few spe-
cialized units for economic analysis in the organization. More generally, the Commission’s hiring policies and organiza-
tional hierarchy do not seem conducive to strong expert roles. The picture that emerges is that of an organization 
where expert knowledge is neither tied to a particular profession nor firmly rooted in the departmental structure. 
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1. Introduction 
The top civil service in Britain is dominated by general-
ists educated at Oxford and Cambridge. In France, the 
most important government ministries are populated by 
officials with broad training in politics, law and econom-
ics from the École nationale d’administration (ENA). The 
German and Italian government administrations are 
staffed mainly by lawyers. And in the Scandinavian coun-
tries, the earlier monopoly of lawyers on civil service po-
sitions has been upended by the rise of economists and 
political scientists.  
The permanent administration of the European Un-
ion (EU) is frequently described as a “technocracy” 
where power and legitimacy is based on expertise. But 
what kind of expertise dominates within the European 
bureaucracy is far from obvious. The EU administration 
is often believed to be the exclusive territory of legal 
experts, skilled at navigating the complex body of trea-
ties and directives. Yet, surveys of the European Com-
mission services have revealed that lawyers are out-
numbered by economists (or by social scientists in 
general) both in top administrative positions and among 
the rank and file (Page, 1997, p. 77; Georgakakis & De 
Lassalle, 2008; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 40).  
At the same time, some scholars have argued that 
professional expertise—be that in law or economics—
has little salience in the Commission. The professional 
background of administrators is less important than 
their specific institutional capital, such as experience in 
various cabinets and directorates (Georgakakis & De 
Lassalle, 2008). Other studies also indicate that the 
emphasis on specialist expertise in the Commission has 
declined, as a result of changes in recruitment policies 
and requirements for greater staff mobility (Ban, 2010; 
Wille, 2013; Christensen, forthcoming). 
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This brief discussion highlights that the role of pro-
fessional expertise in the European bureaucracy is a 
multifaceted issue. It is not only a matter of how many 
lawyers, economists or natural scientists there are in 
the administration, but also of the extent to which offi-
cials identify with their discipline and bring their pro-
fessional expertise to bear in their daily work. In other 
words, professional knowledge has both an objective 
and a subjective side (Fourcade, 2009). Recognizing this 
dual nature of expertise is important because adminis-
trative behavior is closely related to officials’ identifica-
tion with different roles (cf., March & Olsen, 1989). 
Whether administrators identify as professional ex-
perts, civil servants or representatives of particular 
outside interests will influence their approach to the 
formulation of policies. As such, the kind of profession-
al expertise that dominates within a bureaucracy can 
have major implications both for the direction of policy 
and the quality of decisions (Babb, 2004; Chwieroth, 
2009; Christensen, 2013).  
As we know from organizational sociology, the sali-
ence of different kinds of professional expertise in ad-
ministrative organizations depends on features of 
those institutions (Fourcade, 2009). Organizational 
structures, cultures and policies for recruiting and 
promoting staff can shape the role of experts by either 
stimulating or eroding professional identities. For in-
stance, organizations specialized along professional 
lines may accentuate distinctions between officials 
with different educational backgrounds, whereas spe-
cialization along sectoral lines may erase such distinc-
tions (Gulick, 1937). Thus, while some bureaucracies 
are organized in ways that are conducive to strong ex-
pert roles, others are structured in ways that put pro-
fessional expertise in the background. 
Based on this insight, the article seeks to explore 
the salience of different kinds of expertise in the Euro-
pean Commission by examining the organization of ex-
pertise. It thus poses two questions: (1) How are differ-
ent kinds of professional expertise inscribed in the 
organization of the Commission? (2) What can this tell 
us about the position of professional knowledge in the 
Commission? To answer these questions, the article 
analyzes new empirical data on the recruitment poli-
cies and departmental structure of the organization. 
Important to note, the analysis is restricted to pro-
fessional expertise, that is, knowledge acquired 
through extensive formal education in a specific aca-
demic discipline (e.g., Abbott, 1988). One can of course 
imagine other types of expertise that are relevant in 
public administration, such as knowledge about how to 
get proposals through the policy process. Yet, what we 
are interested in here is not so much the institutional 
know-how of officials as the influence of bodies of 
knowledge defined outside the Commission, be that in 
the economics discipline, the legal profession or some 
other professional group. 
The analysis shows that while economics may have 
overtaken law as the most common educational back-
ground in the Commission, neither the recruitment sys-
tem nor the departmental structure seems to encour-
age the development of economic expertise. The 
proportion of staff recruited as economists equals that 
of law recruits and has dropped steadily since the 
1970s. And the creation of specialized units for eco-
nomic analysis has so far been restricted to a small 
number of departments—and does not match the 
many legal units scattered around the Commission.  
More generally, the Commission’s recruitment poli-
cies and organizational structure do not seem condu-
cive to strong expert roles. In recruitment, low educa-
tional requirements and a marked shift towards hiring 
generalists undercut the image of the Commission as 
an “expert organization”. Also, the Commission’s de-
partments are generally not structured along profes-
sional lines or organized in ways that promote the gen-
eration of in-house expertise. The picture that emerges 
of the Commission is that of an organization where ex-
pert knowledge is neither tied to a particular profes-
sion nor firmly rooted in the departmental hierarchy.  
These findings challenge the conventional narrative 
about the Commission as a “technocracy”—at least if 
we understand a technocracy as a system where expert 
knowledge is the primary basis of power and legitima-
cy. In fact, compared to other international bureaucra-
cies, the Commission organization places remarkably 
little emphasis on professional expertise. The findings 
also provide some comfort to those who fear that 
economists are taking over the Commission, as there 
are few indications that the organization is becoming 
similar to economist-dominated international bodies 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment (OECD).  
To be sure, the type of organizational analysis em-
ployed here has clear limits, as it tells us more about 
the structures that may shape the use of professional 
expertise than about how this knowledge actually is 
used. Yet, it may provide a useful method for compar-
ing the organization of knowledge across different na-
tional and international bureaucracies, since it relies on 
data that in many cases are readily available. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews 
existing literature about the role of professional ex-
perts in the Commission. Section 3 introduces the no-
tion of professional expertise and discusses theoretical-
ly how organizational features can shape the role of 
professional experts. Section 4 presents empirical data 
on the role of professional expertise in the recruitment 
system and organizational structure of the Commis-
sion. The final section discusses how the findings speak 
to common narratives about the role of expert 
knowledge in the Commission. 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 13-25 15 
2. Expertise in the European Commission 
The European Commission is by far the largest and 
most important executive institution of the EU, with a 
staff of more than 23,000. It is the principal initiator 
and preparer of policy in a decision-making system that 
includes the Council of the European Union, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Council. The Com-
mission is a supranational body, formally independent 
from the Council, which represents the member states. 
The Commission is led by a college of politically ap-
pointed Commissioners and their political secretariats 
(cabinets). The permanent bureaucracy of the Commis-
sion (the “Services”) is divided into departments (“di-
rectorates-general” or DGs), which are again divided 
into departments, units and sections. 
The Commission is frequently characterized as a 
“technocracy”, that is, as a body that “recognises exper-
tise as the sole basis for authority and power” (Radaelli, 
1999, p. 758). The technocratic character of the Com-
mission is usually linked to its extensive engagement in 
regulatory policy-making, where “[k]nowledge, rather 
than budget, is the critical resource” (Radaelli, 1999, p. 
759; Majone, 1996). Boswell similarly argues that ex-
pertise is the basis for the legitimacy of the Commis-
sion, as “the institutional structure of the Commission 
[implies] a strong propensity to value knowledge as a 
source of legitimation” (Boswell, 2008, p. 472). The 
idea of a European “technocracy” can of course be in-
terpreted to mean a number of things, ranging from the 
kind of corporatist policy-making instituted by Jean 
Monnet to the fact that member states are represented 
mainly by experts to the central role of knowledge in 
EU policy-making (Radaelli, 1999, p. 759). But it is the 
latter interpretation we are most interested in here.  
If the Commission is a technocracy, what kind of 
“technicians” dominates? It is commonly thought that 
the Commission is an organization dominated by law-
yers. Given the law-based character of the European 
Union and the Commission’s legal functions (e.g., as 
“guardian of the treaties”) that seems like a reasonable 
inference. Yet, a number of studies indicate that this is 
no longer the case. Georgakakis and de Lassalle (2008) 
show that legal training dominated among top officials 
in the early decades of the Commission’s history, with 
lawyers occupying Director-General positions in most 
DGs, including Economic Affairs and External Relations. 
However, economists took over many of these positions 
in the 1990s, replacing lawyers as the largest profession-
al group in the top echelon of the Commission services. 
The rise of economists and the relative decline of 
lawyers also show up in surveys of Commission admin-
istrators at all levels. Based on biographical data from 
1991–1993 (n = 622), Page finds that 39 percent of 
Commission officials had training in the social sciences 
(including economics), 26 percent in law, 26 percent in 
the natural sciences and 9 percent in the arts (Page, 
1997, p. 77). A smaller survey conducted in 2005–2006 
(n = 179) finds that 41 percent of officials had their 
main training in the social sciences, 28 percent in law, 
24 percent in the natural sciences and 6 percent in law 
(Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012, p. 53). And a large recent 
survey (n = 1793) shows that 29 percent of Commission 
administrators had their main educational qualification 
in economics or business, 26 percent in the “hard” sci-
ences (such as math, engineering and life sciences), 24 
percent in law, 15 percent in politics and other social 
sciences and 5 percent in the arts and humanities 
(Kassim et al., 2013, p. 40).  
Kassim and colleagues also find great variation 
across departments in the educational background of 
officials. The proportion of lawyers was highest in the 
Legal Service (92%), DG Justice, Freedom and Security 
(46%) and DG Competition (44%), while the presence 
of economists (including business and statistics) was 
greatest in DG Economic and Financial Affairs (87%), 
Eurostat (63%) and DG Budget (59%). They conclude 
that “[w]hile lawyers are concentrated in a relatively 
small number of medium-size Directorates-General, 
mostly concerned with compliance, enforcement and 
regulation, economists are found in significant num-
bers across several Directorates-General that perform 
a variety of functions” (Kassim et al., 2013, pp. 40-42). 
Taken together, these surveys do not single out one 
professional group as dominant within the Commis-
sion, but they do suggest that legal expertise has been 
complemented with—and partly replaced by—other 
types of expertise, in particular from economics and re-
lated areas.  
Yet the educational composition of staff can only 
tell us so much about the salience of different kinds of 
professional knowledge. Georgakakis and de Lassalle 
argue that while many top officials in the early decades 
had legal training, they were not “pure jurists” exclu-
sively devoted to legal knowledge and conceptions of 
the world (2008, p. 3). Rather, having legal training was 
instrumental to building general bureaucratic capital, 
defined within the organization rather than with re-
spect to external professional groups. One example is 
that top Commission bureaucrats in their CVs put little 
emphasis on their external educational achievements 
as compared to their internal work experience in de-
partments and cabinets (Georgakakis & De Lassalle, 
2008, p. 2). The authors also suggest that economists 
are “involved in similar strategies of accumulation of a 
specific institutional capital” (p. 7), in the sense that 
their economics background per se is less important 
than their acquired experience inside the Commission.  
More generally, this argument suggests that while 
Commission officials may have an educational back-
ground in law or economics, they do not necessarily 
identify closely with these disciplines or act mainly 
based on ideas or norms rooted in the profession. For 
Commission officials, the role as a “professional ex-
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pert” may be less salient than other roles, such as the 
role of the “administrator” devoted solely to the organ-
ization or department. And indeed, Trondal and col-
leagues have found that expert or “epistemic” roles are 
much less prominent in the European Commission than 
in the secretariats of other international organizations 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
OECD. In the Commission, they observe, hierarchy 
trumps expertise and officials “do not identify with 
their scholarly discipline” (Trondal, Marcussen, Larsson, 
& Veggeland, 2010, p. 167).  
Moreover, some scholars point out that new re-
quirements that staff rotate frequently between posi-
tions have weakened the position of specialist experts 
in the Commission: “The new mobility system”, argues 
Wille, “has clearly favored the generalist over the spe-
cialist. Specialization tends to diminish promotion as-
pects, as it restricts departmental mobility. Generalists 
are a lot more likely to be considered for a wider range 
of senior positions than officials with a highly special-
ized technical background” (Ban, 2010, p. 18; Wille, 
2013, p. 129). It has also been argued that changes to 
the system for selecting staff have put specialists at a 
disadvantage, as the current selection procedure puts 
primary emphasis on very general skills (Ban, 2010; 
Christensen, forthcoming). 
However, while these scattered arguments suggest 
that expert roles have organizational underpinnings, 
EU scholars have not systematically investigated the 
factors that condition the salience of professional 
knowledge in the European Commission. To be sure, 
the role of professional knowledge in the Commission 
is influenced by a broad range of factors, including the 
institution’s demand for expertise and the supply of 
professionals from the education systems of a changing 
set of member countries. Yet, this article focuses spe-
cifically on the organizational features of the Commis-
sion that may shape the role of different types of ex-
pertise in the administration. To put some flesh on this 
notion, the next section provides a theoretical argu-
ment about professional expertise and the organiza-
tional factors that condition it. 
3. Professional Expertise and Organizations 
Professions are exclusive occupational groups that pos-
sess special skills acquired through extensive formal 
training. These skills are rooted in an abstract system 
of knowledge that is inaccessible to outsiders (Abbott, 
1988, p. 8). Medical doctors have exclusive knowledge 
about how the body works and how to treat illnesses, 
just as lawyers have unique expertise in interpreting 
the law. This special expertise is the very basis for the 
position and power of professions in society. Im-
portantly, professional knowledge is defined within 
professions, that is, in specialized academic depart-
ments or in professional associations. As such, it is to a 
significant degree insulated from political, administra-
tive or corporate demands. For instance, politicians 
cannot at will intervene in how doctors treat cancer. (If 
they did, it would severely discredit the treatment.) 
This autonomy distinguishes professional expertise 
from other types of knowledge one could identify as 
expertise. For instance, knowledge about how an organ-
ization works, amassed through long experience in the 
organization, is certainly an asset for those who possess 
it. So is the training one gets on the job in how to carry 
out particular tasks. Yet these kinds of expertise are de-
fined within the bounds of the organization and are thus 
of a different nature than expertise defined in external 
professional groups. In this article, we are concerned on-
ly with professional expertise, since this kind of 
knowledge in many cases has been shown to have a pro-
found impact on public policies, perhaps most promi-
nently in the case of economic knowledge (e.g., Babb, 
2004; Chwieroth, 2009; Fourcade, 2006; Reay, 2012). 
The position of different types of professional ex-
pertise varies between public bureaucracies, both 
across countries and across departments. For instance, 
the role of lawyers in the British civil service differs 
from the position of lawyers in the German administra-
tion or in the French bureaucracy. As the sociologist 
Marion Fourcade argues in the book Economists and 
Societies (2009), these differences are intimately linked 
to the character of administrative institutions. Four-
cade demonstrates how the variation in the role and 
practice of economists in the U.S., the U.K. and France 
was intimately related to historically determined dif-
ferences in their “administrative orders”, that is, in the 
“organization and exercise of ‘government’” (p. 247). 
For instance, the central role of economists as top bu-
reaucrats and advisers in the U.S. was partly the result of 
the porous and specialist nature of the American state, 
whereas the marginal role of economists in the British 
bureaucracy was linked to its closed and generalist civil 
service. Central to Fourcade’s argument is the point that 
administrative institutions not only filter the access of 
economists to bureaucratic positions (cf., Weir & 
Skocpol, 1985), but also construct the role of economic 
experts within the state: “By defining the terms under 
which economic knowledge is incorporated into public 
policy, public administrations have implicitly contributed 
to construct the professional role of the economist” 
(Fourcade, 2009, p. 25, original emphasis). 
Building on Fourcade’s insight about the dual im-
pact of administrative institutions, this article argues 
that two organizational factors can be seen as particu-
larly important in shaping the role of professional ex-
perts in public bureaucracies: recruitment systems and 
organizational structures. Recruitment systems vary in 
terms of the type of knowledge and skills that is em-
phasized in hiring. Officials can be selected on the basis 
of qualifications and skills in specialist fields, such as 
academic credentials in the fields of economics or law. 
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Strongly specialist recruitment is found for instance in 
the top U.S. civil service and in the Scandinavian public 
administrations (Peters, 2010, p. 90). There is also vari-
ation in what type of specialist expertise is emphasized 
in recruitment to the civil service, whether legal, eco-
nomic, political or in the natural and technical sciences. 
Alternatively, officials can be recruited based on gen-
eral skills, such as intelligence or the ability to analyze 
or communicate. In this case officials are expected to 
be able to cover any kind of position and receive any 
specific training on the job. Examples of generalist sys-
tems are the traditional British civil service, staffed by 
bright amateurs trained in the liberal arts, and the 
French administration, where top bureaucrats have 
broad training from the grandes écoles. 
Recruitment systems shape the role of professional 
experts in part by filtering access to bureaucratic posi-
tions. For instance, hiring based on advanced specialist 
credentials in economics—say, a Ph.D. degree and 
proven quantitative skills—reserves positions for this 
particular professional group. By contrast, selection on 
general skills renders professional credentials irrele-
vant and favors a different type of candidate. But re-
cruitment policies also contribute to constructing the 
role of the official. Selection procedures and recruit-
ment categories signal to candidates which qualities 
are valued by the organization, thereby shaping offi-
cials’ perception of their own role. Job advertisements 
for “economists” that ask for a Ph.D. and quantitative 
method skills send the message that officials will be 
valued as economic experts, reinforcing this profes-
sional identity. By contrast, a general advertisement for 
“administrators” signals to officials that their profes-
sional background is unimportant for the job and in-
stead supports a general civil service identity. 
The second organizational factor that conditions the 
role of professional experts is the degree of organiza-
tional specialization along professional lines. All complex 
organizations have highly specialized organizational 
structures, which allow the organizations to carry out 
their tasks. Public administrations can be horizontally 
specialized along a number of dimensions, including ge-
ography, purpose (sector), process or clientele (Gulick, 
1937). Structures are never neutral: by bundling some 
issues together and keeping others apart they direct at-
tention, structure contact patterns, establish cleavages 
and mobilize bias (Egeberg, 2003, p. 117; Schattschneider, 
1960). Organizational specialization along professional 
lines is a form of process specialization. Specialization 
along professional lines means that tasks are divided be-
tween different kinds of expertise rather than according 
to the issue at hand. An example is a competition agency 
that is divided into an economic division and a legal divi-
sion rather than into issue-based divisions for, say, car-
tels, mergers and state aid. A closely related practice is 
the institutional “licensing” of professional jurisdiction 
through the reservation of positions for particular pro-
fessions (Fourcade, 2006, p. 151). Examples are job titles 
such as “chief economist” or “legal adviser”. 
Specialization along disciplinary lines concentrates 
professional expertise in one place, thereby stimulating 
further development of professional knowledge and 
closer links to the academic discipline. A professionally 
specialized unit can become almost like an academic 
department, with seminars, paper series and regular 
interaction with the outside academic discipline (Froeb, 
Pautler, & Röller, 2009, p. 577). But specialization along 
professional boundaries also establishes cleavages that 
reinforce disciplinary identities. The division of work in-
to “economic” and “legal” questions reifies this profes-
sional distinction, signaling to officials that professional 
frames are the most relevant for addressing any issue. 
This is likely to increase the emphasis on professional 
values at the expense of other administrative norms. 
By contrast, specialization along other dimensions (sec-
tor, territory) may imply a fragmentation of profes-
sional expertise, which hinders the further develop-
ment of professional knowledge and privileges other 
organizational identities over disciplinary ones. 
To summarize, the key message of the theoretical 
discussion is that organizational features not only re-
flect but also shape the role of professions. Recruit-
ment systems and organizational structures are dura-
ble features of organizations that condition the role of 
different types of professional experts. These organiza-
tional features are not, however, unchangeable. For in-
stance, a professional group may well instigate changes 
in recruitment policies or further organizational spe-
cialization along professional lines that cements its po-
sition within the organization. 
4. The Organization of Expertise in the European 
Commission 
How is professional expertise “organized” in the Euro-
pean Commission? This section surveys the role of dif-
ferent types of professional experts in the Commis-
sion’s recruitment system and organizational structure. 
4.1. Recruitment System 
Since the 1960s, the European Commission has relied 
on open competitions for recruiting permanent staff. 
These competitions—often referred to with the French 
term concours—are essentially civil service examina-
tions that are either general or restricted to a specific 
field (see e.g., Coombes, 1970; Spence, 1997; Stevens, 
2001). The concours has changed significantly over 
time, going from ad hoc competitions for few posts in 
the 1960s to regular mass competitions to recruit hun-
dreds of officials in the 2000s. The largest waves of re-
cruitment have been connected to the successive en-
largements of the European Union. Recruitment was 
previously the responsibility of the single European insti-
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tutions. But on the eve of the Eastern enlargement in 
2004, a special agency—the European Personnel Selec-
tion Office (EPSO)—was set up to administer open com-
petitions for all the European institutions (Ban, 2010). 
From which fields has the European Commission se-
lected its staff, and how has this changed over time? 
This is examined by analyzing the notices for the Euro-
pean Commission’s recruitment competitions for “ad-
ministrators”—that is, staff with policy tasks—over the 
period 1956 to 2013.1 The competition notices are col-
lected from the online archives of the Official Journal of 
the European Union.  
Figure 1 maps out the main fields in which the Com-
mission has organized recruitment competitions from 
1960 until today. The categories listed (“economics”, 
“general administration”, etc.) are drawn directly from 
the competition notices, which means that they are the 
fields of recruitment as defined by the Commission. The 
figure shows the period during which the Commission 
recruited administrators under a certain heading. 
As we can see, the Commission instituted competi-
tions in a core set of specialist fields following the Com-
mission merger in 1967. These included “law”, “econom-
ics” (often accompanied by “statistics”), “financial 
                                                          
1 The analysis comprises all the administrator competitions in 
this period that were aimed at selecting multiple officials (a 
total of 284 competitions) while leaving out competitions for 
single positions. 
management” and “agriculture”. Recruitment competi-
tions in the fields of law and economics/statistics have 
been organized regularly ever since. Recruitment in the 
field of financial management was first complemented 
with and eventually replaced by competitions in the 
“audit” field. Similarly, competitions in agriculture were 
supplanted by recruitment in the fields of “food safety” 
and “public health” in the 1990s. Perhaps more remark-
able was the emergence and transformation of competi-
tions in public administration. This field was not part of 
the initial recruitment categories, and competitions in 
“general administration” were first introduced in the 
late 1970s. The category was later changed into “general 
administration, public administration and management” 
and finally re-labeled as “European public administra-
tion” in 1998, becoming the most important field of re-
cruitment to the Commission (as we will see below). It 
should also be noted that completely general competi-
tions have been organized intermittently. Such competi-
tions were first organized in the early 1960s and then 
revived in the first half of the 1990s and used occasional-
ly since then. 
How has the relative importance of these fields 
changed over time? This is assessed by looking at the 
number of officials recruited through competitions in 
the various fields in different periods. Figure 2 shows 
the changes in the distribution of recruited officials by 
field of competition. 
 
Figure 1. Fields of recruitment to the European Commission. Source: Author’s illustration based on competition notices 
compiled from the Official Journal of the European Union. 
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Figure 2. Officials recruited by field in different periods, percent. Source: Adapted from Christensen (forthcoming), 
based on data compiled from the Official Journal of the European Union. Note: Before 1991, complete data on the 
number of administrators to be recruited is available only for the periods 1972–1978 and 1980–1983. 
First of all, the figure does not show a dominance of 
either lawyers or economists in recruitment to the 
Commission. The number of recruits from the two 
fields has been roughly similar throughout the organi-
zation’s history. From 1972 to 1983 the Commission 
recruited 332 administrators through law competitions 
and 315 through economics competitions; since 1991 it 
has recruited 1,773 administrators in law and 1,847 in 
economics. We also see that competitions in law and 
economics—arguably the two core specialist fields in 
the Commission—have declined in importance over 
time. While these fields together accounted for nearly 
half of recruited officials in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
they account for only between 20 and 30 percent of 
recruits in the period after 1990. 
At the same time, competitions in the field of gen-
eral public administration have become increasingly 
important. The proportion of recruits coming from 
public administration competitions increased from 
around 5 percent in the 1970s and 80s to 26 percent 
during the eastern enlargement from 2003 to 2009. 
Public administration was the largest field of recruit-
ment over the period 1991–2013: the 2,472 adminis-
trators selected in the field easily surpassed the num-
ber of recruits from law or economics. On top of this 
came the 720 administrators hired through completely 
general competitions. The growing importance of the 
field of “audit” is also noteworthy: since 1991 the 
Commission has recruited almost as many officials in 
the audit field—1,716—as in law and economics. 
What emerges is a picture of a Commission that in 
recruiting civil servants seeks knowledge in four major 
fields—law, economics, audit and public administra-
tion—and that over time has shifted its emphasis from 
the first two fields towards the latter two. But to what 
extent is recruitment in these fields tied to specific pro-
fessions and professional qualifications? This is exam-
ined by looking at the educational requirements for 
participating in the competitions. Higher and more 
specific educational requirements indicate that a com-
petition is restricted to a certain profession. In the 
Commission, the minimum education required to take 
part in competitions has consistently been low: until 
1998 a university diploma or degree of unspecified 
length was required; from 1998 to 2004 a degree that 
“gives access to doctoral studies” was needed; and 
since 2004 the requirements have been a 3-year uni-
versity degree for lower-level policy administrators and 
a 4-year degree for officials in higher grades. 
Whether applicants’ degrees have to be in a specific 
discipline or not has varied over time and across fields 
of competition. Figure 3 shows the specificity of the 
degree required for Commission competitions in dif-
ferent fields, with a higher value indicating a more spe-
cific degree required. 
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Figure 3. Specificity of degree required to participate in competition, by field of competition, 1958–2013. Note: 1: De-
gree in any field; 2: Degree in “relevant field”; 3: Degree in any of a wide range of fields; 4: Degree in one specific field . 
Source: Adapted from Christensen (forthcoming). 
The figure shows that up until the late 1980s compe-
titions in all of these fields usually required only a “rele-
vant degree”, even for competitions in law or econom-
ics. The requirements were even less specific from 1988 
to 1995: in this period a degree in any field was suffi-
cient to take part in any competition. Since 1998 the re-
quirements have been differentiated across competition 
fields: Competitions in law and economics require de-
grees in those specific disciplines, while competitions in 
“European public administration” are open to graduates 
from any field. Audit is in a middle position, requiring 
university education in a “relevant” field. In other words, 
whereas recruitment in the fields of law and economics 
is linked to a specific professional background, recruit-
ment in the buoyant field of “European public admin-
istration” is not tied to any specific professional profile. 
Finally, it should be noted that the recruitment tests 
in themselves have become more general over time. As 
Carolyn Ban points out, the first stage of the tests intro-
duced in 2010 assess a set of very general competences, 
such as verbal, numerical and abstract reasoning (Ban, 
2010). Christensen (forthcoming) also shows that the 
emphasis on specialist skills in the competition tests has 
dropped over time. While the assessment of specialist 
knowledge constituted 50 percent of the tests in the 
1970s, it only accounted for 28 percent of the tests in 
the periods 1990–2002 and 2003–2013. This trend is 
similar across the main fields of competition. 
To summarize, the European Commission’s re-
cruitment system shapes the organizational role of dif-
ferent kinds of professional expertise by defining the 
categories/fields of knowledge, by linking these cate-
gories to specific professions (or not), and by determin-
ing the relative importance of these fields. The Com-
mission’s recruitment regime has defined some clear 
professional categories, in particular law and econom-
ics, which sets it apart from completely generalist re-
cruitment systems like the traditional British or Irish 
system. At the same time, the professional content of 
these categories has been weak (e.g., low and generic 
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degree requirements and generic tests). The more spe-
cialist fields have also lost ground relative to a public 
administration category that is not rooted in any par-
ticular type of professional expertise. 
4.2. Organizational Structure 
The role of professional expertise in bureaucratic or-
ganizations is not only shaped by recruitment systems, 
but also by organizational structures. To what extent is 
the European Commission specialized along professional 
lines? To what extent have professions “claimed” parts 
of the organization as their exclusive jurisdiction? The 
ambition here is to draw a “professional map” of the 
Commission services to get at the role of different ex-
pert disciplines in the organization, with a special focus 
on law and economics. What we are looking for is de-
partments, units or positions that are defined in pro-
fessional terms, such as a division of economic analysis 
or a position as legal adviser. The data presented is 
drawn from the online Commission Directory, which list 
all the units and positions in the Commission, as well as 
from organizational charts and other information avail-
able on the websites of the various Directorates-
General and Services. 
The institutional position of legal experts is most 
strongly expressed in the Commission’s Legal Service, 
which is the only truly professional department of the 
organization. The Legal Service is an internal horizontal 
department charged with providing legal advice to the 
Commission and its services. The Legal Service must be 
consulted—and provides a legal opinion—on all docu-
ments put before the Commission. The service reports 
directly to the President of the Commission, giving it a 
more independent position that the regular departments. 
Almost all officials have a legal background (92%), and 
most positions are defined as “member of the Legal Ser-
vice” (268 of approximately 350 positions). The Legal Ser-
vice is thus a textbook example of professional jurisdic-
tion: concentrating legal expertise in a dedicated 
department with special prerogatives rather than spread-
ing it out across the regular departments gives legal 
knowledge a privileged status within the organization. 
Other Commission departments also have dedicat-
ed legal units and positions. This is illustrated in Figure 
4, which shows the number of organizational units spe-
cialized in legal (and economic) analysis, and Figure 5, 
which shows the number of designated legal (and eco-
nomic) positions per department.  
 
Figure 4. Number of organizational units dominated by lawyers or economists in the departments of the European 
Commission. Note: A unit is classified as legal (economic) if the majority of the positions in the unit are legal (economic) 
positions. In the Commission, a “unit” is the organizational entity below a “directorate” and above a “section”. Sections 
are here coded as half a unit. Source: Author’s illustration based on data collected from the online Commission Directory. 
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Figure 5. Number of designated positions for lawyers and economists in the departments of the European Commission. 
Note: Legal positions include the position titles “legal officer”, “legal assistant” and “member of the legal service”. Eco-
nomic positions encompass the position titles “economist”, “economic analyst” and “socio-economic analyst”. Source: 
Author’s illustration based on data collected from the online Commission Directory. 
In total, there are 51 legal units and 828 positions 
as “legal officer” or “legal assistant” in the Commission. 
As we see in the figures, legal expertise has a promi-
nent position in some departments beyond the Legal 
Service: DG Internal Market and Services has five pre-
dominantly legal units (e.g., “Application of Single Mar-
ket law and relations to Parliament” and “Public pro-
curement legislation I”) and 63 positions as “legal 
officer” or “legal assistant”; DG Justice, Freedom and 
Security has three legal units (e.g., “Consumer and 
marketing law”) and 30 designated legal positions; and 
DG Enterprise and Industry has two legal units and 48 
legal positions. We also see that there is a legal pres-
ence in a majority of the departments: 22 of the Direc-
torates-General and Services have at least one legal 
unit or section, and 19 departments have at least 10 
designated positions for legal experts. These units are 
usually labeled “Legal matters” or “Legal affairs” and 
provide inside-the-department legal advice. Thus, in 
organizational terms, we see that legal expertise in the 
Commission is both concentrated—in the Legal Ser-
vice—and widespread—with legal units in most de-
partments. 
Moving on to economic expertise, there are in total 
39 predominantly economic units and 467 positions as 
“economist”, “economic analyst” or “socio-economic 
analyst” in the Commission. The greatest concentration 
of economic expertise is found in DG Economic and Fi-
nancial Affairs (ECFIN). In the strictest sense, DG ECFIN 
is not a professionally specialized department: it does 
not provide economic advice to the Commission de-
partments like the Legal Service offers legal advice. It is 
instead a functionally organized department heavily 
dominated by officials with training in economics. 87 
percent of its policy staff have a background in eco-
nomics or similar fields, and it has 293 dedicated posi-
tions as “economic analyst” or “economist”. The de-
partment carries out some economic research in-
house, which involves development of economic mod-
els and analysis of data, and publishes economic work-
ing papers written by staff and collaborators (e.g., in 
the “European Economy Economic Papers” series). It is 
also part of the department’s mission to interact with 
the academic community of economists in the devel-
opment of policy.  
There are specialized economic units in some other 
departments too. Most notable in this regard is the 
Chief Competition Economist in DG Competition. The 
Chief Competition Economist was established in 2003 
with the objective of boosting the Commission’s capac-
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ity to apply economic and econometric analysis to 
competition cases (Röller & Buigues, 2005). The Chief 
Economist is appointed for a fixed term and is usually a 
prominent academic in the field. He leads a team of 
about twenty economists with Ph.D.s in the specialized 
field of Industrial Organization (Röller & Buigues, 2005, 
p. 6). The Chief Economist’s Office is organized sepa-
rately from the regular department and reports directly 
to the Director-General. Its role is to provide inde-
pendent economic advice on cases and policy, both by 
supporting the case handlers with technical economic 
analyses and by providing an independent opinion on 
particular cases or policy issues based on economic 
knowledge. As such, the Chief Economist’s Office plays 
much the same role within DG Competition as the Le-
gal Service does across the departments: its role is to 
provide an independent opinion rooted in a particular 
body of professional knowledge on the work of the 
regular bureaucracy. The Chief Economist’s office also 
serves as a center for economic debate on competition 
issues, organizing seminars with prominent competi-
tion economists, producing working papers and regu-
larly consulting outside academics on policy questions 
(Röller & Buigues, 2005). In some respect, the office 
thus bears stronger resemblances to an academic de-
partment than a regular bureaucratic unit.  
The European Commission also has a Chief Trade 
Economist inside DG Trade. But this office is smaller—
with a staff of seven economists—and is tucked away 
deep down in the departmental hierarchy. It thus 
does not have the same institutional position as the 
chief economist in the competition area. Beyond the 
areas of competition and trade, economists have a 
sizeable presence in agriculture and internal market 
regulation. Both DG Agriculture and DG Internal Mar-
kets and Services have three predominantly economic 
units (such as “Economic analysis of EU agriculture” 
and “Analysis of financial market issues”) and around 
20 designated economist positions. In addition, Euro-
stat is heavily dominated by statisticians, whose 
knowledge borders closely on economic expertise. Yet 
specialized economics units and positions are far less 
widespread in the departmental structure than legal 
ones. Only nine Directorates-General or Services have 
at least one economics section or unit, and only eight 
departments have more than ten economist posi-
tions.  
It thus seems that while economists have surpassed 
lawyers both in top positions and in the rank and file of 
the Commission, economic expertise does not have the 
same broad organizational entrenchment as legal 
knowledge. Compared to law, economics is less clearly 
defined as an independent form of expertise worthy of 
specialized organizational units. In other words, there 
may be more officials with economic than legal back-
ground in the Commission, but fewer economists qua 
economists than lawyers working in legal positions.  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The empirical data presented above sheds light on the 
role of professional expertise in the European Commis-
sion. Yet, there are clear limits to what the data can tell 
us. Most importantly, it does not tell us how many 
economists or lawyers there are in the Commission, 
only how many economists or lawyers were recruited 
as such and how many work in positions or units de-
fined as economic or legal. For instance, the analysis 
does not pick up economists or lawyers who are re-
cruited as public administrators and work in general 
administrator positions. But, as argued in the theoreti-
cal section, whether an economist is recruited as an 
economist and works in a position/unit defined as eco-
nomic is highly significant for his or her identification 
with a professional expert role. And that is what this 
article has tried to examine. 
With this caveat in mind, how do the empirical find-
ings speak to common narratives about experts in the 
Commission? In an often-repeated narrative the Com-
mission is portrayed as a “technocracy”, that is, an or-
ganization where expertise is the basis for power and 
legitimacy (Boswell, 2008; Radaelli, 1999). This narra-
tive is also popular with journalists, who rarely mention 
the European Commission without alluding to its tech-
nocratic character. Against this backdrop it is interest-
ing to note that neither the Commission’s recruitment 
system nor its organizational structure seem conducive 
to strong expert roles. Recruitment to the Commission 
does include competitions for specialists in fields such 
as law and economics. But the recruitment of special-
ists in these fields has dropped relative to hiring within 
more generalist categories like “European public ad-
ministration”. And the generally low educational quali-
fications required to participate in law and economics 
competitions do not seem geared to attract high-skilled 
experts. The Commission’s organizational structure 
contains some departments and units organized 
around particular forms of expertise, such as the Legal 
Service, DG Economic and Financial Affairs or the Chief 
Competition Economist. The latter is an example of an 
organizational unit that explicitly encourages the use 
and further refinement of expertise and that is bound 
to reinforce identification with professional knowledge 
and expert roles. But units like this remain the excep-
tion. The vast majority of Commission departments are 
not structured along professional lines or designed in 
ways that promote the generation of in-house exper-
tise. The fact that the Commission bears few resem-
blances to an “expert organization” in terms of how it 
selects its staff and structures its tasks should lead us to 
reconsider the claims about its technocratic character. 
A second account suggests that economists play a 
growing role in the organization. In part this is based 
on surveys which show that the number of officials 
with a background in economics has surpassed the 
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number of law graduates (Georgakakis & De Lassalle, 
2008; Kassim et al., 2013, pp. 40-42). But it is also part 
of a broader narrative about the rise of economists 
within public bureaucracies worldwide (Fourcade, 
2006). Is the European Commission turning into an 
economist-dominated institution like other interna-
tional organizations? Looking at recruitment and or-
ganizational structures there are few signs that this is 
the case. The analysis of the Commission’s open com-
petitions did not show an increase in the number of 
economists recruited or in the economics qualifications 
demanded of candidates. On the contrary, the propor-
tion of officials recruited through economics competi-
tions has dropped steadily since the 1970s. This does 
not necessarily imply that fewer economists have been 
hired, but it does mean that fewer economists have 
been hired as such. In the Commission’s organizational 
structure some specialized economics units have 
popped up since 2000, including the Chief Competition 
Economist and the Chief Trade Economist. This institu-
tionalization of an independent economic advice func-
tion expands the professional jurisdiction of econo-
mists at the expense of lawyers. But this trend does 
not extend across the Commission: so far the creation 
of economic analysis units has been limited to a small 
number of departments. Economists do not have the 
same broad organizational “license” that lawyers have, 
neither in terms of specialized units nor earmarked po-
sitions. Speaking of economists dominating the Com-
mission thus seems premature. 
Where does this leave the question of professional 
expertise in the Commission? The picture is decidedly 
blurry: while a few departments are clearly dominated 
by one profession or the other, most are unclaimed 
territory in professional terms. The role of legal exper-
tise is supposed to be waning but remains firmly root-
ed in the organization; economists are said to be on 
the rise but are not broadly entrenched organizational-
ly; and in the meantime public administrators with 
generalist knowledge are pouring in through the re-
cruitment competitions. More fundamentally, profes-
sional background may have little relevance for ex-
plaining administrative behavior in the Commission: 
professional cleavages and distinctions appear to be 
less important in organizing the Commission’s daily ac-
tivities than for instance departmental boundaries 
(Egeberg, 2007, p. 149). 
The ongoing eurozone crisis does, however, illus-
trate well that the type and extent of professional ex-
pertise matters for how policy-making bureaucracies 
tackle important policy issues. To some, the handling of 
the crisis has revealed a wide gap in economic compe-
tence between the heavily professionalized European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission. In 
an opinion piece in the New York Times entitled “Crisis 
of the Eurocrats”, Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winner in 
economics, drew a clear distinction between the “gen-
uine technocrats” in the ECB and the “fake techno-
crats” in other European institutions (Krugman, 2014). 
Surely, this is an over-simplification. But concerns 
about boosting the capacity for economic management 
may well spur greater interest in cultivating expertise 
in economics within the Commission. And recently, 
there have been signs of renewed efforts to hire highly 
educated economic specialists to the organization. In-
vestigating how the crisis influences the role of profes-
sional expertise in the organization is certainly an in-
teresting topic for further research. 
More generally, in order to further pursue the 
questions raised in this article we need to know more 
about how Commission officials perceive their roles (as 
professional experts or otherwise) and how the issue of 
expertise plays out in concrete policy processes. To be 
sure, the present analysis only scratches at the surface 
of a very complex set of issues. Discarding the stereo-
type of the European “technocrat” seems overdue, but 
whether to replace this image with that of the rule-
oriented lawyer, the economist concerned about effi-
ciency or the administrative all-rounder remains an 
open question. 
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